Insights · Consumer & retail · Artificial intelligence

The Deal You'll Never Know You Lost

AI agents are starting to bargain on our behalf. In a real-money test, people with the weaker agent got worse prices and rated their deals just as fair.

At a glance

  1. When your AI bargains with someone else's AI, the result depends on which model you're using. Stronger agents won better prices in every study we found.

  2. The losses are hidden. In Anthropic's Project Deal, owners of weaker agents rated their deals as fair as everyone else did.

  3. Markets fix bad deals that people notice. These go unnoticed, so platforms should show which agent is acting for whom and give owners a log they can read.

Same bike, stronger vs. weaker agent (Project Deal)
Yearly loss per weaker-agent household by 2030 (Theoria estimate)

A broken folding bike sold twice in December 2025, to the same buyer, from the same seller. Once it went for $38. The other time it went for $65. Nothing about the bike changed. What changed was the software doing the haggling.

The sales happened inside Project Deal, an experiment Anthropic ran with 69 of its employees. Each person got a $100 budget and an AI agent that listed, bargained and closed deals for them. In two of the four rounds, each person had a coin-flip chance of getting Anthropic's small Haiku model instead of its top model, Opus. The weaker agents got worse prices, and their owners rated those deals as just as fair.

That's the risk in the next shopping revolution. We are about to send bots into a room we never enter, and we very likely won't know when they lose.

The scoreboard: what a weaker agent costs

In Project Deal, an Opus buyer paid less on average than a Haiku buyer, against a median item price of $12. An item sold by Opus fetched more than the same item sold by Haiku. Yet owners scored Opus deals 4.05 out of 7 for fairness and Haiku deals 4.06. Anthropic's write-up says the price gap was imperceptible to participants.

Exhibit 1

The weaker agent sold the same bike for $27 less, and its owners rated their deals just as fair

Project Deal, Anthropic, December 2025

Sale price

same bike, same buyer and seller, $

$38 →

$38Weaker agent$65Stronger agent

+$27 (+71%) with the stronger agent

Fairness rating

owners' average, 1–7 scale

4.06 vs

1234567Weaker agent4.06Stronger agent4.05

Same rating. Different price.

Source: Anthropic, Project Deal (published April 24, 2026).

Note: The bike is one example. Across all items, Opus buyers paid $2.45 less on average (p = 0.015), and items sold by Opus fetched $3.64 more (p = 0.011, 44 items). Weaker = Claude Haiku 4.5; stronger = Claude Opus 4.5.

That was a small, friendly marketplace. Larger tests point the same way. Researchers at Stanford's Digital Economy Lab had AI agents bargain with each other over electronics, cars and real estate. Buyers with weaker agents paid more than when both sides were equally capable, and weaker seller agents lost up to 14% of their profit. Weak buyer agents also broke their owners' budgets in more than 10% of cases. One agent told to spend $500 on a phone paid $900.

Why this stops being a lab curiosity

Shopping agents are moving from demos toward checkout. OpenAI added in-chat buying to ChatGPT in September 2025, on an open standard built with Stripe. McKinsey estimates agents could orchestrate of US retail spending by 2030. Morgan Stanley's forecast is far lower: of US e-commerce.

To size the stakes, Theoria built a stylized city of 100,000 households in 2030. We took McKinsey's figure and assumed half of households use a cheaper or free agent. We also assumed agent skill matters on a quarter of purchases (the bargained or heavily searched ones), with an 8% penalty, between the 2% and roughly 20% seen in the studies. On those assumptions, each weaker-agent household loses about , about nationally. This is a Theoria estimate, not an observed result.

Exhibit 2

A weaker agent could cost a household anywhere from about $15 to $1,500 a year. The central case is about $150

Yearly loss per weaker-agent household, 2030, $ (Theoria estimate)

Share of purchases where agent skill matters →

Outlined: central case, a year · about nationally

Sources: McKinsey; Census; Anthropic; Stanford Digital Economy Lab study; Theoria analysis.

Method: loss = agent-run spending per household ($7,418: $1 trillion ÷ 134.8 million households) × share of purchases where agent skill matters × price penalty. Half of households are assumed to use a weaker agent. On Morgan Stanley's forecast the central case is $28–$57. Not modeled: agent failures and scams, time saved, competition among sellers' agents.

The honest range is wide, because nobody yet knows how big the penalty will be or how much shopping will be bargained. The direction is very likely right: every study we found points the same way.

The size of the loss is uncertain. That nobody notices it is the part that matters.

Markets usually fix bad deals because people notice them. A shopper who gets fleeced complains, switches stores, leaves a review or calls a regulator. Consumer protection runs on that signal. Project Deal suggests the signal is likely to fade when machines do the bargaining. The weaker-agent owners weren't angry. They didn't know they had anything to be angry about.

There's a second blind spot. Microsoft researchers built a simulated market with 100 buyer agents and 300 seller agents. Every model they tested showed a strong bias toward the first offer it received, which gave fast sellers a 10–30× edge over better ones. Against some models, scam sellers captured every payment. Economists at Harvard and Penn State have also found that AI pricing agents can drift into high, collusive prices without being told to. And AI-safety researchers have shown that models can pass each other messages a human overseer can't read. None of this needs a villain, just a market where nobody reads the conversation.

Exhibit 3

Forecasts for agent-run shopping differ by up to 5×, and the first big rollout was scaled back

US spending run by AI agents, 2030 forecasts

Morgan Stanley
$190–385B
McKinsey
up to $1T
$0$250B$500B$750B$1T

Sources: McKinsey (Oct. 2025); Morgan Stanley via NielsenIQ (2026); OpenAI; CNBC (Mar. 24, 2026).

Note: The forecasts use different definitions: Morgan Stanley's covers agent-driven US e-commerce, McKinsey's US B2C retail revenue "orchestrated" by agents. McKinsey gives a ceiling, drawn from zero. OpenAI launched Instant Checkout in ChatGPT on Sept. 29, 2025, and scaled it back in March 2026.

The case against

The strongest objection is that none of this is new. People have always gotten worse deals when they negotiate badly, and a cheap agent may still beat a nervous human at a car dealership. That's fair. The right comparison is the shopper's own skill, not a perfect robot. Agents also save time. And the rollout has been slower than the forecasts: in March 2026, OpenAI scaled back in-chat checkout and let merchants use their own, saying the first version wasn't flexible enough. A trillion dollars of agent-run spending is a forecast, not a fact.

But the objection misses what changes. A bad human negotiator can see the haggle, learn and do better next time. An agent's loss is hidden in a conversation its owner never reads. It's tied to the subscription tier the owner can afford, and it doesn't feel like a loss. A gap you can't see is a gap you can't close.

Open the room

The fix isn't to ban shopping agents. It's to make the hidden room visible.

Platforms that let agents transact should tell both sides which agent and model is acting for whom, the way a car window sticker tells buyers what they're paying for.

Agent makers should keep a negotiation log the owner can read, with a plain summary: the opening price, the final price, and how it compares with similar deals.

Regulators don't need new law to start. Britain's Competition and Markets Authority said in March 2026 that consumer law applies whether decisions are made by people or by AI. US regulators should say the same about agents that act for consumers, and test whether those agents are faithful to the person paying for them.

The bike didn't care who sold it. Its owner should have. In the agent economy, the price you get depends on the AI you can afford, and you may never see the $27 your agent left on the table.

What would change our mind

  • Larger studies showing cheap agents match or beat typical human shoppers on price, so the gap is no worse than today's.
  • Owners' satisfaction tracking their agent's real results in bigger tests, so the loss isn't hidden.
  • Agent-run spending staying a small share of US retail through 2030, so the dollar stakes stay small.

Sources and method

Where the numbers come from

Data as of November 2026. Tap an underlined number in the article to see its source or calculation.

Every number and its source
ClaimKindSource
69 employees, $100 budgets, 186 deals, 500+ items; four runs, two mixing Opus and HaikuCompany disclosureAnthropic, Project Deal
Bike $38 (Haiku) vs $65 (Opus); Opus buyers paid $2.45 less (p = 0.015); Opus sellers +$3.64 (p = 0.011); median item $12.00, mean $20.05Company disclosureAnthropic, Project Deal
Fairness 4.05 (Opus) vs 4.06 (Haiku) on a 1–7 scale; gap imperceptible to participantsCompany disclosureAnthropic, Project Deal
Weaker buyer agents paid ~2% more; weaker sellers lost up to 14% of profit; electronics, cars, real estatePublished research (verified secondary)Zhu, Sun, Nian, South, Pentland & Pei, arXiv 2506.00073, via Stanford HAI and MIT Technology Review
Weak buyer agents exceeded budget in more than 10% of cases; $500 budget, $900 paidPublished research (verified secondary)Lexology summary of the same paper
100 buyer and 300 seller agents; first-offer bias in every model; 10–30× edge for speed over quality; some models had all payments redirectedPublished researchMicrosoft Research, Magentic Marketplace
AI pricing agents can collude without instructionPublished researchFish, Gonczarowski & Shorrer, arXiv 2404.00806
Models can hide messages from overseersPeer-reviewed researchMotwani et al., NeurIPS 2024
Instant Checkout launched Sept. 29, 2025, with Stripe; scaled back in March 2026Company disclosure; reportingOpenAI; CNBC, Mar. 24, 2026
Up to $1 trillion of US B2C revenue orchestrated by agents by 2030Consulting forecastMcKinsey
$190–385 billion of agent-driven US e-commerce by 2030Bank forecast (verified secondary)Morgan Stanley via NielsenIQ
134.8 million US households, 2025Official dataCensus CPS via FRED (TTLHH)
UK consumer law applies whether decisions are made by people or by AIOfficialCMA, Mar. 9, 2026
About $148 a year per weaker-agent household; about $10 billion nationally; range $15–$1,484Theoria estimateMethod below; agent_gap.py and build_page.py
How Theoria sized the loss

Start with agent-run spending in 2030: McKinsey's upper estimate of $1 trillion, divided by 134.8 million US households (Census, 2025), is about $7,418 per household.

Most shopping happens at fixed prices, where a smarter agent can't bargain. We assume agent skill matters on a quarter of purchases, and that a weaker agent pays 8% more on those, between the about 2% found by the Stanford study and the about 20% in Project Deal ($2.45 on a $12 median item; about 12% of the $20.05 mean). That gives about $148 a year. Half of households are assumed to use a weaker agent, which gives about $10 billion nationally.

Limits: both 25% and 8% are Theoria assumptions with no direct source, and each moves the answer about tenfold across its plausible range (Exhibit 2). McKinsey's figure is revenue orchestrated by agents, not exactly household spending. The estimate leaves out agent failures and scams, time saved and competition among sellers' agents.

Project Deal's limits: participants were Anthropic employees trading small items, so the results show what can happen, not how often it will.

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